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ABSTRACT
Since 1999 the pages of this journal have
periodically carried articles based on the idea of a
‘polibation’ officer, or variants on that theme. The
idea arose from the possible outcomes of increas-
ingly closer collaboration between police and pro-
bation services under the public protection
umbrella. Eight years on it is evident that, in a
variety of settings, roles have been established
which take individual practitioners some way
from their roots in terms of professional practice
and culture. This article briefly revisits this process
and explores the pros and cons of fused roles. It
concludes with the announcement of a split in the
functions of the Home Office which results, at
least on paper, in a decoupling of police and
probation services. The future of the polibation
officer is considered in this light.
BACKGROUND
Back in 1999 I wrote about an emerging
phenomenon, a fusion of police and proba-
tion roles into one entity, the ‘polibation
officer’ (Nash, 1999). This invention was in
response to the growing multi-agency
agenda for public protection and in particu-
lar the possible effect of closer collaboration
between the two services on their ‘tradi-
tional’ roles. At the time I was concerned
that probation officers in particular would
lose their focus on what was considered to
be a welfare or humanitarian approach, one
of their traditional contributions to criminal
justice. My reason for this was that the
nature of the public protection agenda
itself, which appeared to be geared more
towards control and surveillance, would
radically shift probation staff away from
their focus on the welfare aspects of super-
vising offenders in the community. The
polibation officer would become, I
believed, the epitome of the government’s
determination to ‘join-up’ justice. The
argument was that this was not, de facto, a
bad idea, more that it could have consider-
able cultural implications for the organisa-
tions involved. These will be reviewed
briefly below and brought up to date.
However, they will culminate in a discus-
sion of an announcement by the then
Prime Minister, Tony Blair, on 29 March
2007, to split the functions of the Home
Office, with policing remaining in the
Home Office (more heavily focused upon
security) and the new Ministry of Justice
formed of the remaining Home Office
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functions and the Department for Constitu-
tional Affairs. It is within this context that I
wish to consider the future of the poliba-
tion officer, whilst recognising other threats
to what was an imagined concept which has
become a reality, to greater or lesser extent,
in much of the country.
Multi-agency working does not of
course just concern itself with two agencies,
the police and probation services. Depend-
ing upon the issue to be tackled, a variety of
constituents will come together with a
common purpose, for example child pro-
tection. The rationale is clear and in most
respects above criticism. It is almost cer-
tainly the case that any social issue will
involve more than one agency; for example
health, housing, education, police, social
services and possibly probation and prisons
in a child protection matter. The overriding
intention here is to ensure that full com-
munication exists between agencies
involved, that vital information is given,
received and acted upon and that ongoing
reviews also share as much as possible. The
intention is clearly to break down agency
barriers and ensure that professional jeal-
ousies and territory-guarding do not get in
the way of saving the life of another person.
However, there is another very important
aspect of multi-agency working and the
clue is in its name. It is meant to be the
combined knowledge and abilities of a
range of relevant agencies brought together
on one issue. In other words, the whole is
stronger than its constituent parts but its
strength arises from its constituent parts. It is
the coming together of a variety of per-
spectives on one issue that is important,
rather than the elaboration of one view. It
was precisely in this area that police and
probation officers began to work much
more closely together at the beginning to
mid 1990s and by the end of the decade
were, in my view, in danger of fusing
within the area of public protection. Let us
reconsider this agenda for a moment.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE PUBLIC
PROTECTION AGENDA
Throughout the 1990s the public protec-
tion agenda was rapidly growing in political
importance. Although a few well-publicised
cases attracted public and media attention, it
was the battle between Conservative and
Labour politicians that perhaps really ele-
vated it to a position of dominating not
only criminal justice debate, but also policy
and practice. The increasingly unpopular
Conservative Governments, gradually see-
ing their electoral majorities eroded, were
desperate by the mid 1990s, to find some-
thing to distance them from the resurgent
Labour party. In a sense perhaps they
believed they had found the perfect com-
bination in law and order policy (an old
Tory favourite and weakness for Labour), a
political bruiser (Michael Howard as Home
Secretary) and the British public’s love for
‘things American’ (the tough policies of
Ronald Reagan and, later, Bill Clinton).
The importation of American ideas was
intended to ‘smoke out’ the ‘wets’ in the
Labour Party, and bring to the surface the
socialist credentials that it seemed increas-
ingly to wish to cover over. The battle-
ground gradually became that of public
protection, personified by the predatory sex
offender, and particularly by the predatory
paedophile. There appeared to be a clear
attempt by the Conservative Government,
with Michael Howard in the vanguard, to
push the members of the Opposition so far
that they would eventually have to resist or
object. As the chosen battleground had
become the protection of ‘innocence’, this
would have been a set-and-match victory
for the Conservatives. In fact the Labour
Party did not take the bait but under its
bright and ambitious shadow Home Sec-
retary, Tony Blair, began to raise the stakes.
It accepted almost everything that was
thrown into the pot and adopted a policy of
not publicly opposing the Conservative
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measures. As a result, public protection
ceased to be a political issue and quite
simply emerged into policies that were not
really debated. It was within this political
battle and eventual settlement that the
ground for significant changes in police and
probation practice was laid out and led to
the title of my earlier article.
The salient themes of this early public
protection agenda were focused on punish-
ment, disproportionality in sentencing,
‘extra’ punishment for certain offenders and
increased control and surveillance in the
community underpinned by greater collab-
oration between the police and probation
services. An early scene-setting example had
been contained in the Criminal Justice Act
(CJA) 1991. In an Act strongly reflecting
the principle of proportionality in senten-
cing (ostensibly in order to reduce the
prison population which then stood at
48,000), an opportunity to sentence outside
this principle was introduced. In the case of
violent and sexual offenders provision was
made to depart from proportionality in
imposing custody where not warranted by
the instant offence (public protection),
imposing sentences up to their maximum
when not warranted by seriousness, or by
using previous convictions where they
revealed a pattern of negative behaviour.
The 1990s also witnessed the introduction
of mandatory minimum penalties and also
mandatory life sentences in certain cases.
The latter were a variant of the US ‘three
strikes and you’re out’ policy set by Ronald
Reagan. Add to this the introduction of sex
offender registration, introduced in the Sex
Offenders Act (SOA) 1997, and it was clear
that a general toughening and hardening of
the criminal justice process was under way.
Beneath these outwardly harsher policies
were perhaps more subtle changes to the
nature and philosophy of probation work-
ing, themselves a reflection of these new
measures but also perhaps in part as much
an attempt by the probation service to
survive.
It is evident that in this tough, com-
petitive law and order world, the idea of
being ‘alongside the offender’, and com-
mitted to his welfare, would not hold a
great deal of water. Despite a continued
residue of support in the House of Lords for
traditional probation values, the Commons
saw a quite different attitude emerging.
Here it was to be who could be toughest on
crime that would win. As noted above, the
CJA 1991 had already set the tone by
introducing the idea of punishment in the
community and restriction of liberty. The
long-standing principle of probation dis-
posals being regarded as an alternative to a
sentence was abandoned in favour of mak-
ing them community punishments in them-
selves. During a period where it appeared as
if increasing the size of the prison popula-
tion was the thing to do, the probation
service can be thankful for the cautionary
note struck by the Treasury, which alluded
to the huge cost of mass imprisonment and
what this would do with (Conservative)
Government promises to cut taxes. The
philosophy of bifurcation (Bottoms, 1977)
and later ‘punitive bifurcation’ (Cavadino &
Dignan, 1997) was therefore established
whereby dangerous offenders (sexual and
violent crimes predominantly) would
receive harsher sentencing, but non-
dangerous offenders would be sentenced to
punishment in the community, a controlled
and restricted version of the old probation
order, underwritten and enforced by new
national standards of supervision, compli-
ance and enforcement. Thus, in an era
when it looked as if the writing was on the
wall for the probation service, there was an
escape route identified, if it was prepared to
take on the new tough mantle of commun-
ity punishment. It did so; some might argue
with gusto (ACOP,1988) and began to
reposition itself successfully as a public pro-
tection agency as the decade wore on. From
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the mid 1990s, police and probation ser-
vices began to collaborate informally on
work with potentially dangerous offenders
(Kemshall & Maguire, 2001; Nash, 1999)
and, with the introduction of the Criminal
Justice and Court Services Act 2000, this
process was elaborated and became a formal
requirement for police and probation (the
latter added to by the prison service in the
Criminal Justice Act 2003) as responsible
authorities. Thus it could be argued that this
collaboration, which I argued led to the
emergence of a polibation officer, was a
product of tough times and brought
together two unlikely bedfellows. For the
probation service it hinted at organisational
survival when its future, at least for a time,
looked in doubt. For the police service it
offered the chance to utilise the expertise of
another agency in its new responsibilities
for sex offenders in the community under
the Sex Offenders Act 1997. It also, of
course, built upon best practice in child
protection cases and also on the increasing
multi-agency collaboration over mental
health cases.
MULTI OR MONO?
At issue therefore, at least for some com-
mentators, was the impact this agenda
would have upon the ways of working, or
perhaps more accurately, the organisational
culture of the separate agencies involved. In
other words, would the strength of various
perspectives coming together on one issue
be replaced by a more homogenised view
arising from joint protocols and agreed
decisions? The coming together was also
very specific in that it was a child of its time
and heavily politicised from the off. The
agenda had been set to protect the most
vulnerable from the most awful and thus
had a proactive impetus that would soon,
according to a number of commentators,
drift into additional punishment, or per-
manent ‘marking’ and exclusion (Garland,
2001). It was this sense of where the process
might be heading that suggested the idea of
the polibation officer to me, and had led
Kemshall and Maguire (2001) to describe
the ‘policification’ of probation as they saw
it. The rationale behind these ideas was that
the very nature of the agenda just briefly
described was a controlling, enforcing and
potentially punitive one. As such it some-
what conflicted with the traditional values,
and ways of working, long held by the
probation service and described by Vanstone
(2004) as ‘humanitarian’. The new agenda
was greatly concerned with assessing and
managing risk, tasks that would grow into a
‘big business’ (Kemshall, 2003). But hidden
within this agenda, perhaps, was the
increasing reconceptualisation of problems
or need into risk, thus transforming the way
in which probation officers would routinely
deal with offender difficulties. As Kemshall
(p. 1) notes, risk assessment and manage-
ment has ‘replaced the traditional rehabil-
itative focus’. Now of course the best
outcome of multi-agency working is not
only to ease communication but to share
perspectives and experiences. In other
words, agencies which work with offenders
in their communities, with experiences of
family dynamics and the effects of a range
of personal and social problems, may see
the world quite differently from a person
concerned with preventing or detecting
crime. Both positions are perfectly valid and
both contribute fully to the way in which
offenders can be safely managed in com-
munities. But, if an agenda begins to raise
the profile of one of these aspects, and
another becomes unfashionable or off-
message, the variety of perspectives
becomes muddled.
Thus commentators such as Kemshall
and Maguire (2001) and Nash (1999) began
to wonder if there would be an impact on
the culture of the organisations concerned,
and if one culture would begin to dominate
another. Because the public protection
Nash
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message was so strong, and one which was
traditionally associated with police activity,
there was a feeling that probation might ‘go
the way of the police’. However, it should
be clear that public protection was not the
sole driver at this time. It has already been
noted that organisational survival was an
issue for the probation service after 1979
and throughout the 1990s a fair amount of
positioning had been undertaken from
within and without. Thus the probation
service had been keen to state its credentials
as a credible criminal justice agency for
modern day penal policies. It was prepared
to accept that much of the philanthropic
ideal had dissipated since its inception at the
beginning of the nineteenth century and its
ethos needed a makeover. The police also
needed to shift their position. As a result of
a number of high profile cases and incid-
ents, they had sought to increase their com-
munity engagement and work with other
agencies: see Wright (2000, pp. 288–9) for a
summary of incidents. For our purposes,
the emerging public protection agenda
served both intentions admirably. For the
probation service, the opportunity to get
alongside the police would undoubtedly, in
some quarters, enhance its credibility as a
law and order agency. For the police it
would formally involve them in a multi-
agency forum that matched their crime
control and management intentions, but
also afforded them the chance to work with
others on new roles such as taking respons-
ibility for sex offenders in the community.
Thus this new agenda offered several
opportunities at different levels. There was
the prospect of enhancing the rebranding of
probation and also the development of a
role for the police which was increasingly
epitomised by multi-agency collaboration.
There was also the prospect, however, of
agencies becoming more like each other
and thus becoming indistinct, or of agencies
actually changing to become more like
their stronger partners, thereby losing their
individual traditions and assuming others.
This was the point at which the ‘polibation
officer’ debate began.
THE FUSION OF ROLES?
As noted above, some of the early com-
ments on this issue hinted that the proba-
tion service was the most likely to change
and both Nash (1999) and Kemshall and
Maguire (2001) coined terms to describe
this process. Further variations on this
theme can be found in Mawby and Worrall
(2004), Nash (2004) and Mawby, Crawley
and Wright (2007). Both the polibation
concept, and ‘policification’, came as a
result of not only reading between the lines,
but actual observance of the embryonic
multi-agency public protection arrange-
ments (MAPPA). As indicated above, the
new mood surrounding public protection
was very much a controlling and enforcing
one, with the assessment and management
of risk as the primary driver. Probation
staff, in particular, could be seen to be
moving towards new territory. A much
stronger emphasis on control and restric-
tion, with needs becoming redefined as
risks, meant that a traditional focus upon
offender ‘welfare’, even if maintained,
would be constructed within a quite differ-
ent climate. For the police service, however,
the notion of surveillance and restraining
measures was familiar territory, and it was
not too difficult to foresee the influence
they might bring to bear upon multi-
agency proceedings. At the same time they
might well have been looking for assistance
with new-found responsibilities such as
those for sex offenders in the community.
This was therefore a forum where two key
criminal justice players both had something
to gain from closer collaboration. In some
sense the new agenda was slightly different
from child protection conferences, in that
agencies perhaps shared roles and goals in a
more focused manner. Child protection,
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although always a high-profile issue, did
perhaps remain principally a social services
‘problem’. Public protection, from the off,
was a shared responsibility and as such indi-
vidual agency perspectives perhaps merged
more readily than in previous multi-agency
fora. More than that, however, was the very
strong central direction concerning how
this process should be managed and con-
ducted. The issue therefore was whether
MAPPA would be the sum of its individual
but different parts or the sum of increasingly
similar parts. At the heart of this issue lies a
question of what multi-agency working
should really mean.
In commenting on multi-agency work
with young offenders, Sheldrick (1999)
notes that the strength of having a variety of
agencies involved in assessment is a variety
of perspectives and those individual pro-
fessionals should stick to the limits of their
expertise. If, however, agencies increasingly
share the public protection party line, then
this difference may be compromised. As
such this process might be thought of in
these terms: probation officers are, in many
ways, doing a job they have always done
but, for a variety of reasons, seeking to do it
differently. The police however are under-
taking in a sense new responsibilities but
perhaps within the same monitoring and
surveillance mandate. There is therefore
something of a natural coming together of
these two roles and the issue becomes one
of who changes the most?
It may, however, be more than simply the
process of closer collaboration that is
impacting upon individual agency practice.
It could be that the sheer scale of the public
protection process, its centrality to political
debate and constant interest for the media,
has a greater impact. In other words the
spectacular increase in both numbers of
offenders and bureaucracy of the process
determine a different way of working. Let
us consider one aspect of this. There are at
present over 46,000 MAPPA offenders in
the community. Approximately 12,500 are
assessed as level 2 (local inter-agency man-
agement) and nearly 1,230 as level 3 (senior
multi-agency oversight) (Scott, Grange, &
Robson, 2007). Although much of the
activity may therefore be a risk filtering
process, it still requires huge resources to
make those decisions. These decisions are,
however, high risk in themselves and there
is a growing awareness of risk aversion and
defensive practice in a number of agencies.
The parole board has, it appears, become
more cautious in its release decisions for
certain categories of prisoners. From April
to September 2006, out of 901 requests for
lifer release only 106 were granted, the ratio
typically being 1:5 previously (BBC, 2006).
In its 2005–6 annual report, the chairman
of the parole board, Sir Duncan Nichol
stated, ‘we will be absolutely sure before we
release’ (Parole Board for England and
Wales, 2006). Aside from the impossibility
of being absolutely sure, this statement
implies that risk-taking by the board will
very much reduce in the near future. In
another example, in a recent discussion
with a probation officer, she spoke of her
despair at the prison service marking all files
‘high risk’ rather than take the chance of
getting a decision wrong. Elsewhere I have
written about the importance of really get-
ting to know offenders if high-risk assess-
ment and management is to mean anything
(Nash, 2006). However, anecdotal discus-
sion suggests that time is the one resource
no longer available to criminal justice staff
as throughput and completion targets dom-
inate and, more importantly, determine
funding levels.
High risk is a construct. It is determined
by government in particular but also to a
great extent by what the media perceive a
dangerous person to be. This continues to
be fixed on matters such as predatory and
stranger assault, despite the continuing
evidence that it is familial assault which
leads to a far greater number of (vulnerable)
Nash
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victims — and even features very highly in
a large number of politically sensitive seri-
ous further offence cases. Corrigan (2006)
has written about how sex offender regis-
tration in New Jersey (Megan Kanka’s
home state) tends to exclude virtually all
familial or acquaintance abusers. This is
because they mostly score zero on the risk
scale and thus are outside registration
requirements. The strength of MAPPA
arrangements should precisely be to bring
knowledge of similar scenarios, and patterns
of offending behaviour, to the table for
discussion. More importantly perhaps, they
should be a platform for lobbying govern-
ment over what could be argued is a run-
away public protection train. Yet, as agencies
become more similar in their approach to
public protection (or say it is not their
responsibility), so the knowledge base for
such interventions decreases.
According to the government, public
protection arrangements are working very
well, not least when the low number of
serious further offences committed by those
deemed to present the highest risk is so low
(20 per cent of all such offences). Yet this
does mean that 80 per cent of all serious
further offences are committed by people
assessed as low to medium risk and thus
falling outside the MAPPA processes. What
does this really tell us? On paper, high-risk
offender supervision is working well. But,
as ever with dangerousness, no one knows
if these offenders operating at the top end
of the offending spectrum would have
reoffended in a serious manner. Historically
the reconviction rate for released life sen-
tence prisoners is low (less than 4 per cent
for ‘grave’ offences; see Kershaw, Dowdes-
well, & Goodman, 1997) so it is perhaps
precipitate to argue that the arrangements
work, because no one knows if they actu-
ally needed to work. This is not as crass as it
may appear. By delineating offenders into
risk categories the temptation will always be
to push people up rather than down
(although resources may eventually force a
reversal). Implicit also is the notion that
high risk and very high risk must be ‘excep-
tional’ so everyday violence and sexual
assault becomes downgraded. But isn’t it
these very people who are going on to
offend again in a serious manner? The
government’s current proposal for contest-
ability in the probation service (Home
Office, 2006a, 2006b) appears to suggest
that work with many of these lower-risk
offenders can be carried out by other
agencies: they do not require the skills of
fully trained probation staff. Yet it is these
offenders who may be posing the most
problems of repeat offending behaviour and
escalation to more serious offending.
The polibation officer was an idea; a
view of how one agenda might impact
upon individual agency practice. It is evid-
ent, however, that there are people fulfilling
this role working in public protection
teams, or polibation teams. They will however
focus on the top end of offenders in a very
bureaucratically prescribed manner. The
very nature of the response to these
offenders is likely to focus on tightly pack-
aged risk assessment with little scope for
leeway. The ‘risks’ probation officers once
took with such offenders (with seemingly
little serious fallout) are perhaps now a risk
too far. But it was that risk-taking that
enabled probation officers to make their
distinct contribution to criminal justice,
develop their skills at working with high-
risk individuals and get to know them. The
evidence suggest this is increasingly less the
case and it becomes difficult not to view
this as a deskilling exercise at the very time
when the government lauds the high levels
of skill and expertise in the MAPPA pro-
cesses. At the same time, these (perhaps
diminishing) skills are lost on working with
lower risk offenders and indeed, it may be
the case that these offenders are increasingly
supervised by practitioners with lower level
and more generic skills and knowledge.
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Working with high risk should inform
working with low risk — this is how signs
of escalation might be recognised. By artifi-
cially splitting practice along risk categories
(which should in every case be a continuum
anyway (Bridges, 2006)), vital knowledge
and experience will be absent from large
sections of probation supervision practice.
Has the advent of the polibation officer
hastened this process? My feeling is that it
has. The polibation officer has become the
embodiment of a process which has bureau-
cratised and pigeonholed risk. Understand-
ing the vagaries of human behaviour and
the distinctiveness of their actions, which
made Prins (1988) suggest that there were
only 300 to 400 truly dangerous people in
the country, appears to be increasingly
squeezed out of everyday practice. People
skills are required less than an ability to
construct and monitor a plan based upon
bureaucratically derived risk indicators,
which, as noted earlier by Corrigan (2006),
may omit significant numbers of potentially
dangerous people. It is worrying if there is
an assumption abroad that risk is something
to be managed without really knowing as
much as possible about the offender and his
history (Madden, 2007, pp. 64–8).
‘Polibation officer’ is thus a fanciful name
for what has become in reality a public
protection officer, who may be a police or
probation officer and occasionally a prison
officer. There has not only been closer
collaboration but there have been actual
secondments and appointments to multi-
disciplinary teams. Public protection has
grown exponentially and, partly as a result
of this, the government plans to replace
probation officers with others to work with
lower-risk offenders. This is likely to con-
tinue to erode much of the traditional wel-
fare (or ‘humanitarian’; see Vanstone, 2004)
culture of the probation service. This work
will be carried out by people ‘better suited’
and thus obviate the need for this approach
from probation officers who will increas-
ingly focus on risk management (minus a
welfare approach). This could be the nail in
the coffin of probation officer distinctive-
ness. At a time when the service is celebrat-
ing its centenary, many of its traditions are
being cut off at the roots. This is not,
however, a nostalgic call for a return to
probation ‘values’. It is a reaffirmation of
the application of this approach to public
protection. The philosophy behind not
adopting a ‘welfare’ approach to public pro-
tection appears to be concerned with it
being too offender focused, with a greater
emphasis on offenders’ rights above those of
the public (HMIP, 2006). This is a flawed
idea. A welfare approach was not about
making life better for offenders by provid-
ing counselling and practical assistance: it
was this but linked to their offending
behaviour. It was a welfare approach linked
with the causes of crime and, in some cases,
if these causes were ameliorated, the risk of
further crime was lessened. It is also not to
say that officers raised in a welfare tradition
could not exercise control and restraints in
the community, or have an understanding
of victims’ feelings. By excluding this
approach and relying increasingly upon the
control of risks, whole aspects of human
behaviour, in its infinite variety, are reduced
to paper-based risk classifications. This may
be the worst outcome of the polibation
process.
BACK TO SQUARE ONE?
The plans to split the functions of the
Home Office, already noted in this article,
will, at least in terms of Ministerial re-
sponsibility, shift lines of accountability of
police and probation staff. The underlying
message in the proposals is government
concern with the big issues of the day:
terrorism and immigration. Where will
public protection from high-risk offenders
fit with this new world? It is evident that
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hi-tech solutions are increasingly seen as the
way to respond to these risks (for example,
the possibility of compulsory lie detection
tests and satellite tracking of offenders).
These measures have even been supported
by organisations such as Barnardo’s (2006).
The adoption of some of these measures
with high-risk offenders (sexual offenders
in particular) has in part hastened the
decline of the welfare approach and reconfi-
gured probation officers as part of the con-
trol process. Examples might be the
administration of drug tests alongside a
remarkably strict enforcement policy. Will
the location of the probation service in a
Ministry of Justice alter this ethos? This
takes us back almost to crystal ball time.
A new Ministry with an emphasis on the
work of the courts, prisons and probation,
all of which have a stake in, and are very
much feeling, the impact of public protec-
tion measures, may feel able to formulate
counterarguments to the prevailing political
orthodoxy. However, there has already been
a lively debate concerning the split and
some commentators have doubted that
there will be any significant benefit. For
example, Ken Jones was reported in The
Independent on 20 April 2007, as saying that
it would be harder for the police to work
with others in the criminal justice system.
He said, ‘. . . intelligence-gathering and
supervising dangerous offenders rely on all
criminal justice agencies working in part-
nership, and separating them into two
ministries mean that we will have to work
much harder to ensure that the strong part-
nerships that have been built up continue to
develop’ (Bentley, 2007). Concern has been
expressed over the independence of the
judiciary and the possible compromising of
legal resources in a Ministry with prisons as
a major competitor (Rozenberg, 2007).
The government is clear that public protec-
tion remains a priority for both Home
Office and Ministry of Justice and, as if to
underline this, says that the ‘Home Secret-
ary will continue to have a core role in
decision-making in this area’ (Cabinet
Office, 2007a). However, it is not difficult
to see the potential tensions of departments
which remain concerned about overcrowd-
ing (prison service), the extended use of
public protection sentences (prison and
probation services), the involvement of
Ministers in sentencing decisions (the judi-
ciary) and sentencing becoming restricted
by resource issues elsewhere in the system.
There are also tensions to be seen in other
aspects of the government’s proposals. For
example, the security, crime and justice
strand of the government’s Policy Review
(Cabinet Office, 2007b, p. 9) suggests that
‘personalised case management [will be] a
reality for all offenders and bring a renewed
focus to serially prolific offenders’. Else-
where in the document this is described as
‘targeting the offender, not the offence’
(p. 26). Yet, elsewhere the push for greater
efficiency is epitomised by the govern-
ment’s quest for ‘contestability’ (see the
Offender Management Act 2007) for
the probation service and the desire for the
service to use a range of high-quality ser-
vice providers to work with offenders. How
does this really help getting to know the
offender, such a crucial component of
working with dangerousness?
Lord Falconer, the first head of the Min-
istry of Justice stated, ‘There is one reason,
and one reason alone, why we need the
Ministry of Justice: to improve the justice
system for the people of this country’
(Mitchell, 2007). Such a grand statement
can encompass many aims, some of which
will undoubtedly be in conflict. In com-
menting on the proposals, the Director of
the Prison Reform Trust, Juliet Lyon, said
the new Ministry, ‘could mark the start of a
fairer, more balanced criminal justice sys-
tem with a return to proportionality and
fairness in sentencing, a probation service
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valued for careful casework and manage-
ment of risk, and prisons back where they
belong as places of last resort’ (Tempest,
2007). Thus there is a diversity of opinion
where the new Ministry might position
itself. There is already concern that courts
will lose funding in the race to build more
prison places. Others suspect that a lawyer-
dominated Ministry will only let out the
offenders the police have caught. What is
clear, however, is that there is an opportun-
ity for some agencies to take a step back and
rethink the way in which they operate.
It is clear that public protection arrange-
ments will continue to straddle the two
departments but there has been something
of a symbolic break. Probation staff may be
able to take advantage of Juliet Lyon’s hope
for a refocused service. At the same time, it
is to be hoped that the police service does
not retreat to old ways under its re-
emphasised security mantle. The polibation
officer may indeed have been decoupled
and this may not be such a bad idea. The
trick will be for the two main players,
police and probation services, to focus on
what they do best and bring both these
experiences to the MAPPA table.
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